5: Blanco Izaga G-4,5 (1914-1945) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3
Aith Waryaghar

59 i) Summary:--The Rifian family is patriarchal and patrilineal, agnatic and polygamous (i.e. polygynous). It needs to be large because of possible loss through feuds or lack of hygiene. Although 562 428 legally a woman inherits one-half of what a man does (i.e. sons inherit twice as much as daughters), Rifians interpret Muslim inheritance laws in their own way, through customs such as "men's habus"[49], or the return to her house of a divorced woman, whether this be Koranically sanctioned or not. A woman does not inherit but is, in effect, inherited[50]; she bears children but cannot give them her name. She works, but cannot buy or sell; she exists to give pleasure to her husband, and is maltreated in return; but she is probably happier 000 than many of her European counterparts.....In my own opinion, the (Spanish) Protectorate has improved the status of women...and I think that if the Rifians consider men to be the superior of the sexes, this is so undoubtedly because men had to protect their womenfolk constantly, with rifle in hand. They saw in them a cause of weakness, but recognized them as being necessary to group survival (sic!). The Rifian family needed a headman with unquestioned authority, rigorous discipline without sentimentality, and an automatic ability 562 to heal breaches. Women were exempt from feuding and had at their disposition their own markets, reserved for them exclusively; in a sense, they formed a society which was semi-independent from that of [926] men. In battle, they incited men to combat. The shift today (1935) [178] toward Koranic norms is more apparent than real, and is taking place at the cost of parallel diminution, at the same time, of the socio-political importance of the group.[51]

701 own jma'ths; they were headed by men of their own localities; and 'Abd al-Krim only reserved for himself the right to nominate individuals in his confidence for top positions[5].

[619] The contingents of each tribe were headed by the notables of that tribe, and were instructed independently within the whole harka

619 agglomerate. The tribal notables received news of the objectives
726 they had to attain; they took their contingents into battle; and
701 afterwards, they abandoned the field and brought their harkas home....

[621] Through their representatives in the agraw, the jma'ths knew the
[623] contingent which was requested, and they made the division and nomin-
701 ated the chiefs[6]. There were both volunteers and conscripts; but in
[702] each house, one man had to stay at home. An amghar or the amghar was the elected warchief, and he established his contingent....He did not
[621] abandon his house or agricultural tasks or coerce anyone to fight[7],
[623] and the jma'th saw to an equitable distribution of men under arms at all times. Only shurfa, old men, boys and individuals with physical defects were exempt from harka service.

726 Attempts were made to respect geographical order, and each contingent was called upon to engage in combat only on its natural front. The order of battle was traditionally known, and was answerable to political necessity. Coexistence was easier for harka members on their natural fronts, of course, in their own land; resistance was more effective, displacements were more rapid and dispersion was less serious. Knowing the country perfectly, they could send groups to defend passes or watersheds or gorges in relays, each one two or three hours behind the last, so that later arrivals could increase the

726 strength of those who were first on the spot, and so that the points which were most threatened could be easily and quickly reinforced. [182] [701] The dissemination of contingents was imposed by geographical factors (i.e. by the extreme poverty of an area which is excessively compartmented and rought country), by political ones (i.e. lack of a single head at the top of the chain of command other than individuals of purely local prestige, and a recruitment system which set limits on the employment of large units) and even by technical ones (i.e. the European notion of reducing the defense of fixed points of strategic interest, as well as in finding them, is difficult for Rifians to assimilate, for they themselves merely wait in their hilltop houses, etc.)[8].

C) Rifian Alliances (fragmentary):

619 628 181 [602] The Rif was a mosaic of independent tribes, gnawed at by internal disputes in an inhospitable land. It was a powder-keg of individual personalities who placated misfortunes with more misfortunes, with misery, envy and egotism; each one of these men were followed by minuscule groups of kinsmen and partisans, with no tie greater to oppose an invader than their own ambition and convenience....

619 There was in the Rif, however, a certain internal equilibrium by which small tribes like the Targist, Thafarsith and Aith Wurishik[9] could persist, even though surrounded by powerful neighbors.

619 616 [648] Alliances seem the logical and necessary step to which the Rifians had recourse when threatened by superior powers, such as that of the Sultans. The main significance of alliances lies in defense against a common danger, as well as in its concomitant, mutual aid;

616 619 726 (614) [728] It must be remembered, however, that not every man in a tribe participated in that tribe's wars (though the participants were always remembered long after the non-participants were forgotten), and in some cases--although they were few--whole clans even remained neutral, though hardly aloof. It is, we suspect, to situations like these that Blanco refers when he states that it is possible to have more than two liffs in a given tribe, for the neutrals would generally be instrumental in arranging for a truce. In this sense, then, they could form, in effect, a third liff--those who opted out of war in any case, and who sometimes even buried the dead of the belligerents: the lineage of Ihawtshen, of foreign ancestry (from the Axt Tuzin), living in the clan territory of the Aith Turirth of Aith Waryaghar and greatly scorned by them, is a classic example; and there are others, as well. [563] Warfare was demanded of the majority, but a minority could find safety through humility, as the few Jews living in the Rif were able and 000 expected to do.

[114] [729] 19--Quite true in theory, but in practice he might seek safety in humility, and bury the dead of the combatants, as the Ihautshen did in Aith Turirth.

[114] 20--This at best is dubious, but at the time he wrote these words, Blanco, like all his French counterparts, was entranced and virtually blinded by the liff theories of Montagne, who thought that liff systems were the be-all and end-all of Berber political sociology.

[682] 21--If a murderer, as was generally the case, was not able to pay the full amount of the rhaqq levied upon him by the imgharen, his agnates and, if necessary, his liff-mates were called in to help him out.

616 619 [162] 22--This is certainly true of the Thafarsith; and although the Aith 'Ammarth are a fair-sized tribe, 13246 strong (in 1960), it is bordered in the east and southeast by the two giants of the Rif, the Aith Waryaghar, 75695 in 1960, and the Igzinnayen, 41653 in 1960. The Aith 'Ammarth feuded bitterly among themselves, also (so ferociously, it is said, that each liff had its own market and its own qa'id); and the [614] principles outlined in note 18 apply here very neatly. One of their liffs, consisting of the clans of Aith 'Abbu and Ija'unen, was aided by the neighboring Igzinnayen clan of Asht 'Asim, as well as by another neighboring clan of another tribe, the Aith Hadhifa of the Aith Waryaghar; while the second moiety, consisting of the clans of the Aith S'aid Ikhrif and Aith r-Hasayin, was abetted by another neighbor, the non-Rifian (in this case, "Jbalan") tribe of the Marnisa. Although even the giants of the Aith Waryaghar and the Igzinnayen both respected the fighting ability of the Aith 'Ammarth, the latter were and are too small to try to get away with anything. These neighbors, therefore, they left severely alone, although they regularly trounced their smaller Sanhaja Srir neighbors of the Aith Bshir and Zarqat.

000 23--Blanco's two different classes of liffs, individual and general, are, in effect, my impermanent, shifting and intra-clan type and my permanent, intermittently reactivated and intra-tribal type, as described in note 18.

24--This is a well-taken point, if a somewhat obvious one. Women, in theory, do not fight, but in more than one instance they have been able to strike blows for the men of their liff. A woman's allegiance, in the

/239 cont./

621 613 614 114 171 /footnote 1 continued/ of the Haha ("Organisation sociale et domestique des Haha /Social and Domestic Organization of the Haha/," pp. 10-11. Now there is an association of "ikhs" of diverse origins there. On the other hand, the bond of blood exists among the households of the same Riffian jema^{c}a.

621 613 it includes about ten houses -- 30 to 40 hearths in all -- and becomes a group strong enough to defend itself. The "tarfiq" heads, willingly set off by the title of "amghar," are feared and respected because they can then assemble 40 or 50 "brothers" 621 resolute for anything. For the most insignificant motive they 628 take up arms and engage in bloody battles with the neighboring 613 hamlets for long years. These are then veritable wars of extermination, which end only in the disappearance or exile of the 726 vanquished. The following example, selected in the fraction of the Aït ^{c}Abdallah, of the tribe of the Beni Ouriaghel, favorite country for soff struggles, will give the measure of the violence of these rivalries capable of breaking most of the social ties.

Discord broke out not long ago between two villages, each peopled by a "tarfiq," the Aït Qasem and the Ibouneharen, following the killing of a dog that belonged to the guest of an amghar. When the Aït Qasem refused to pay the blood price of the dog, namely 50 douros, claimed by the amghar, it came to blows and to war. Twelve men were killed the first day. In the following years 40 men died on one side, 62 on the other, in regular combat, not counting those who were assassinated for vengeance. Finally, the defeated party decided to leave the [722] country. Old men were then seen to take refuge with the women and children in the sacred mountain of the Zerhoun, after having sold their goods in order to be able, in one last effort, to buy a murderer who would avenge their dead. The conditions under [435] which this last was to make the designated enemy disappear were carefully detailed and the stipulations passed before the ^{c}adoul; if the shot killed the adversary, the recompense was /240/ 10,000

621 /240 cont./
628 reals; 5,000 if it only wounded him; if the bullet missed its
613 goal, 2,500. The marksman, however, fortunate or awkward,
726 perished the next day, struck perhaps by a child hidden with a
[435] gun in a thicket of lentiscus.

It is understandable that under these conditions the notion of
613 "khoms" is often obscure; the only group that can exist then is
619 the family, around which assemble by bonds of adoption and mar-
riage the weakest groups and the outsiders so as to form the
"tarfiq."

613 Discords sometimes become so violent that material life
628 frequently stops; only the women then dare to go out into the
fields; the men come to pray at the mosque without abandoning
613 their guns. In these circumstances, the family heads of the
628 whole country gather together in order to decide on a "ribat,"
675 which is respected for several months. This name is given to a
solemn agreement that binds all the members of the neighboring
tribes to repress, by means of very high fines, murders, rapes,
large thefts, aggressions at the markets or on the roads leading to
[681] them. The sums paid by the guilty, which can climb to several
thousand douros, are divided among the contracting tribes. The
"amghars," heads of the most powerful families, have only the
small personal part that goes to them just as to mere individuals.

628 Among the less turbulent tribes of the Rif, as at Targist, at
184 Zerqet, among the Beni Gmil, private wars have not reached as
621 great a development since the inhabitants still succeed in living
grouped in hamlets. The "mouda[6]" or subfractions and even the
632 "khoms" sometimes summon all the warriors in order to deliber-
621 ate common affairs. This meeting, to which each one comes
613 armed, takes the name "agrao" as in the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/
and the Moyen-Atlas /Middle Atlas/. Sometimes the chiefs of
[681] each of the important families put at the head of the khoms an
[671] amghar whose role is to see to the application of the customary
law, to have the fines, or "insaf," paid, with which crimes are
punished according to rules known by all, but not written. Like
[652] the moqaddem in the western Atlas, this amghar collects one
third of the "insaf"; the other two parts go to the tribe.

/295 cont./

619 648 in the creation of a kind of political chessboard analogous to the one that we found among the Masmouda, subsided for a time.

175 726 [648] Several years of peace -- from 1898 to 1903 -- were followed by the passing of the pretender Bou Hamara and soon by the intervention of Spain on the coasts of the Rif beginning from 1909. Anarchy broke out anew; other leffs were again constituted [616] [634] around the two rival fractions of Targist, winning all the country from the West to the East, from the Beni Gmil to the Beni Amret. It was in the course of these combats that there then appeared and grew important such amghars as El Hajj Beqqich, in the north of the Gzennaya, Mohammed ᶜAbdallah of the Ijaᶜounen, in the tribe of the Beni Amret, Mesaᶜoud of Aqqa among the Beni Gmil.

634 [171] /296/ These minor chiefs then are masters more absolute in their tribes than the Masmouda amghars of the same importance; they do not find themselves in fact inconvenienced by the tradition of the oligarchic inflas councils, nor by the memory of the moqaddem's role. Nevertheless, like the amghars of the Haut-[171] [681] [434] Atlas /High Atlas/, they share with the notables the fines paid by the guilty, taking a third when they are still weak and nearly all when they have solidly established their power. In the cantons [614] [581] that they dominate, they establish other amghars chosen from among the strongest "tarfiqt" chiefs and bind them to them by marriages. The authority that they acquire in this way is such that they are capable of conducting far and wide, across the neighboring tribes, expeditions to a distance of a day's march, in order to go to make their word respected and to punish their adversaries. El Hajj Beqqich did this; leaving from the sources of the Nkor, he went with his horsemen to wreak vengeance on his enemies as far as Ajdir.

175 721 634 648 [669] At the time of the great movement for a holy war against Spain in 1921, the amghars figured at the head of the Riffian contingents. We see them take part with ardor in the battle of Anoual. But when ᶜAbd el Kerim, his relatives and companions from the village of Ajdir take, by means of the "Jihad," the command of the Beni Ouriaghel, organize a little state, bend the surrounding tribes to their will in order better to direct the fight